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Abstract
We re-examine the concept of ‘democratic advantage’ in sovereign debt ratings when
optimal repayment policies are time-inconsistent. If democratically elected politicians are
unable to make credible commitments then default rates are inefficiently high, so democracy
potentially confers a credit market disadvantage. Institutions that are shielded from political
pressure may ameliorate the disadvantage by adopting a more farsighted perspective. Using
a numerical measure of institutional farsightedness obtained from the Global Insight Business
Risk and Conditions database, we find that the observed relationship between credit-ratings
and democratic status is strongly conditional on farsightedness. With myopic institutions,
democracy is associated with worsened credit ratings on average by about 3 investment
grades. With farsighted institutions there is, if anything, a democratic advantage.
Keywords: Sovereign debt, Default, Risk premia, Autocracy, Democracy, Institutions
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a number of democratic countries defaulting (e.g. Greece and Ar-
gentina) while facing the economic and political fallouts of austerity policies.1 In Greece, a
new government came into power on the basis of an explicitly anti-austerity platform. In
contrast, autocratic countries such as Romania in the 1980s have repaid foreign debt even in
states of the world where repayment arguably imposed a high cost on the citizens. How po-
litical imperatives can sustain sovereign debt in democracies vs. autocracies is discussed by
many authors such as Amador (2012), Beaulieu et al (2012), Guembel and Sussman (2009),
McGillivray and Smith (2003) and Oneal (1994). Many, including Schultz and Weingast
(2003), have argued that there is a ‘democratic advantage’ in repayment.2 As we discuss
in Section 2, the empirical evidence is quite mixed. We argue that short-term electoral
pressures may raise the default rate of democracies, so any democratic advantage must be
conditional on having institutions that counteract such pressures.
A simple model guides our empirical analysis. To finance an investment project, a country
needs to borrow from foreign banks. If the representative citizen could commit to a default
policy ex ante, before the debt is incurred, he would take into account that the risk premium
on the debt will depend on the default policy. However, after the debt is incurred, the
representative citizen would like to deviate from the ex ante optimal policy by defaulting in
more states of the world. If the country’s leader has short-term election concerns, then he
faces a ‘Samaritan’s dilemma’: he cannot implement the ex ante optimal policy because it is
1Default is here broadly defined and includes partial default, e.g. when creditors face a ‘haircut’.
2Others have suggested that autocracy may underpin political stability, but Huntington (1968) argues
that democratic status is neither necessary nor sufficient as a precondition for political order.
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time-inconsistent, i.e., it specifies repayment in states where the citizen prefers to default.3
In equilibrium, there will be too much default and risk-premia will be high: a democratic
disadvantage.4
An autocratic leader, less sensitive to the plight of the masses, might be less inclined to
default. For example, Ban (2012) attributed Romania’s decision to repay its foreign debt in
the 1980s to the leader’s ideological commitment to policy independence. There are in fact
many reasons why such a leader might decide to repay. Typically, a default entails externally
imposed economic or even political restructuring, with associated costs for the incumbent
leader. A default may also signal that the current incumbent has low competence, and that
he is less likely to repay future loans. Reputational concerns might weigh heavily on leaders
who expect to stay in office and would like future access to credit (see Eaton and Gersovitz,
1981, or Kletzer and Wright, 2000).5
With time-inconsistent democracy, the representative citizen might try to reduce the
risk-premium on the public debt by electing a leader whose preferences are biased in favour
of repaying, even in bad states of the world (D’Erasmo and Mendoza, 2016a). However, this
does not solve the time-inconsistency problem if the representative citizen can remove the
leader when a bad state occurs. We therefore expect to find a democratic advantage (in the
sense of low risk-premia) only for mature democratic societies where decision-making can
bypass immediate election concerns. In such societies, ‘farsighted institutions’, such as an
3In reality, not all democratically elected governments behave as Good Samaritans. Hausmann (2014)
describes the repayment decision of the Venezuelan government as “a signal of its moral bankruptcy”.
4Although the model makes strong assumptions, it could be generalized in many dimensions, e.g., to
have heterogeneous citizens. As long as the median voter prefers to default in bad states of the world, the
qualitative insights will not change.
5If a default signals the sovereign leader’s ‘type’, then the well-known Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argument
doesn’t apply, and reputation can underpin true lending contracts.
2
independent central bank, might counteract short-term political pressure and alleviate the
time-inconsistency problem (Stasavage, 2002).6 But in democracies with ‘myopic’ institu-
tions, where decision-makers are exposed to short-term political pressure, the Samaritan’s
dilemma (the time-inconsistency of the optimal policy) applies, and risk-premia are expected
to be high. The hypothesis is therefore that any democratic advantage must be conditional
on having farsighted institutions, where farsightedness means being shielded from short-term
electoral politics when making decisions that have long-run repercussions.
In order to test the hypothesis, we build on Beaulieu et al (2012), which represents the
current state of the art in the empirical literature. This is particularly demanding for our
hypothesis, as these authors find in favour of the democratic advantage. Theory suggests
that income levels, institutions and whether debt is held externally or domestically should
matter for repayment decisions and risk premia. Thus, our first point of departure from
Beaulieu et al (2012) is to split their sample into OECD and non-OECD countries. The
OECD countries have better institutions and debt is held domestically, which is precisely
the scenario where we expect a democratic advantage. The estimation results strongly
support conditionality, even controlling for the level of GDP: in the non-OECD subsample
in particular the empirical relationship between a country’s credit rating and its democratic
status is negative and statistically significant, reversing previous findings.
Our main hypothesis is that the response of observed credit ratings to democracy should
be conditional on a measure of institutional quality that approximates ‘farsightedness’. We
indeed find that when government is measured to be myopic there is a strong democratic
6Bodea and Hicks (2017) in fact show that a country’s credit rating depends positively on the independence
of its central bank.
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disadvantage. In such circumstances democracy is estimated to cost about 3 investment
grades on the standard 16-point grading structure employed by Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s. On the other hand when government is measured to be farsighted there is, if anything,
a democratic advantage.
Arguably the democracy indicator variable may fail to capture the true extent of leader-
accountability. Elected leaders may be confident of continued incumbency, and indeed auto-
crats may be subject to replacement even if not by the ballot. We show that our results are
robust to replacing the democracy indicator with a measure of political competition, again
finding that an increased likelihood of replacement is associated with lower credit ratings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 presents the simple model of sovereign debt and Section 4 tests the two main
predictions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical argument for a democratic advantage starts from the observation that demo-
cratic institutions will align the interests of political leaders with those of their constituents.
If the constituents themselves hold the government debt, then the elected leaders risk los-
ing office if they default on it, and this would serve as a commitment to repay (North and
Weingast, 1989, Schultz and Weingast, 2003). In other words, democratically elected leaders
are inclined to repay the debt because that is what their constituents want. This would be
a democratic advantage: it would lower the risk premia on the government debt. Clearly,
this commitment becomes weaker if the debt is held mainly by foreigners, or more generally,
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if the median voter doesn’t hold much debt. Schulz and Weingast (2003, footnote 49) ac-
knowledge that their argument is “weaker in the case of developing economies whose debt is
held entirely by foreigners” and Guembel and Sussman (2009) agree that debt is less likely
to be repaid when the median voter is not a debt-holder.
Even citizens who are not debt holders may prefer to repay, if default is believed to
translate into widely felt economic costs. For example, a default could imply a negative shock
to the net worth of domestic banks, which could endanger stability within the financial system
(Schultz and Weingast, 2003). For developing countries, the more serious consequence of a
default may be a loss of access to credit markets. However, in a bad state of the world, the
citizens’ immediate concern may be the burden of repayment and associated austerity policies
— increased taxation, contraction of public services (and therefore public sector employment)
and reduced income (either directly from transfers or indirectly via weakened demand in the
economy). Thus, the citizens may prefer default in bad states of the world, although ex ante
they would be better off if they could commit to repay. This time-inconsistency may turn
the democratic advantage into a disadvantage.
Acharya and Rajan (2013) ague that a myopic (popularity-seeking) government may
prefer not to default on externally held debt, at least when the initial debt level is low,
because servicing the current debt allows the government to borrow more in order to increase
current spending. But this requires the ability to credibly commit to repaying a larger debt
in the future, which in turn requires that the future domestic cost of default will be high.
Our model is one-shot but could be extended to several periods. Our qualitative results
would remain the same, unless default costs are expected to become so high in the future
that future governments prefer to repay a large debt even in the worst possible state of the
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world. However, we think it is plausible that there is always a chance that in sufficiently bad
future states, the representative citizen (and hence a popularity-seeking government) would
prefer to default, especially if the debt level is high. This creates time-inconsistency; many
aspects of the model could be generalized (allowing multiple periods, domestic savings, debt
rollover etc.) without changing this fundamental point.
If the population is heterogeneous, then the median voter might attempt to make a
commitment to repay by electing a leader who is biased in favour of bond-holding rich citizens
(D’Erasmo and Mendoza, 2016a). But for the commitment to be credible, it must be difficult
for the median voter to replace the leader in bad states of the world. Our model emphasizes
this commitment problem. For another interesting analysis of distributional considerations
relating to default in a heterogeneous agent model, see D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016b).
The endogenous replacement of the leader distinguishes our model from models where the
probability of losing office is an exogenously given measure of political instability. Cuadra
and Sapriza (2008) analyze how the default decision depends on this exogenous probability
in a model where political leaders are biased towards one or another group of citizens.
Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2009) instead assume the leader can be a patient or
an impatient type (with the former type less likely to default), with lenders anticipating
possible changes in leadership that may trigger default. Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) study
how political instability (turnover) and polarization increase default risk. In these models,
as in our model, the key issue is the commitment problem. However, these authors focus on
the preferences of the leader and on heterogenous voters, while we emphasize the endogenous
replacement of the leader.
In an interesting recent working paper, Bodea and Hicks (2017) find empirical support
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for the hypothesis that a country’s credit rating depends positively on the independence of
its central bank. As an illustration, they mention the case of Hungary, where in 2010 the
parliament passed a law undermining the independence of the central bank. This caused the
major credit rating agencies to immediately downgrade Hungary’s credit rating; Standard
and Poor’s explicitly criticized the weakening of Hungary’s independent institutions such as
the central bank and the constitutional court. Since weakening these institutions presum-
ably makes economic policy more susceptible to public pressure, their analysis complements
ours. For a historical perspective, North and Weingast (1989) attributed the increased
credit worthiness of the English government to the creation of the Bank of England in 1694.
Stasavage (2002) agreed that bureaucratic delegation can restrain government opportunism,
specifically, that debt repayment becomes more credible if the central bank has the right
to withhold revenue from the government in the event of a default. Along the same lines,
Biglaiser and Staats (2012) find that rule of law, strong and independent courts, and pro-
tection of property rights have significant positive effects on credit ratings of developing
countries.
Empirically, there is mixed evidence on the relationship between risk premia on sovereign
debt and the extent of democracy. Saiegh (2005) finds that democracies are, if anything,
more prone to reschedule their debt, but also finds that interest rates are not significantly
different across regimes. Archer et al (2007) found that the extent of democracy, as measured
by the POLITY2 democracy score, had no explanatory power for credit rating in a sample
of fifty developing countries between 1987 and 2003. McGillivray and Smith (2003) find
some support for the hypothesis that leadership turnover improves sovereign bond premia.
Oneal (1994) finds that financial returns to U.S. foreign direct investment over the period
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1950-1984 were higher in countries with authoritarian regimes. In theory, higher (marginal)
returns can easily be reconciled with greater risk premia. Przeworski and Limongi (1993)
find that the relationship between economic growth and political regime is far from clear-cut.
3 Theory
A country has access to an (indivisible) investment project. Implementing the project re-
quires borrowing $1 from a foreign bank. Let r denote the interest rate. The required
repayment is then R ≡ 1 + r. Throughout, we assume the project is implemented and focus
on the repayment decision. After the project is implemented, the representative citizen’s
income, denoted θ ≥ 0, is realized. We assume θ is a random variable with cumulative
distribution F and support [θ, θ̄], where 0 ≤ θ < 1 < θ̄. We refer to θ as the state of the
world.
The time line is as follows.
Stage 1. Competitive banks announce interest rates, and the country’s leader chooses a
bank from which to borrow $1.
Stage 2. The project is implemented and the state θ is realized.
Stage 3. The leader either repays the loan in full (i.e., pays R) or defaults.
Stage 4. The leader is either replaced, or stays in power.
If the loan is repaid at stage 3, the representative citizen consumes θ − R. Her utility is
u(θ − R), where u is an increasing strictly concave utility function. Consumption must be
non-negative so repayment is only feasible if θ ≥ R. To rule out corner solutions, assume
u(0) = −∞. If the country defaults at stage 3, the representative citizen consumes θ. In
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addition, default causes her to suffer a loss of utility L > 0. Her utility will therefore be
u(θ) − L. Following much of the literature on sovereign debt, we may interpret L > 0 as a
“penalty” that international lenders impose on a defaulting country.7
At stage 3, the representative citizen will be indifferent between defaulting and repaying
when the state θ̂ satisfies8
u(θ̂ −R) = u(θ̂)− L. (1)
Strict concavity implies that u(θ−R) < u(θ)−L when θ < θ̂, which means that at stage 3 the
representative citizen prefers default. If θ > θ̂ then u(θ−R) > u(θ)−L so the representative
citizen prefers to repay. Intuitively, since u is concave, repaying the loan is more costly
(in terms of utility) the lower is current income θ. If intense political pressure forces the
leader to always make the decision that the representative citizen prefers at stage 3, then the
cut-off point for repaying the loan will be θ̂ which satisfies (1). But this, as will be shown
below, would imply an excessive default risk: a commitment to repay in more states would
improve ex ante welfare. Intuitively, the equilibrium interest rate depends on the probability
of default, but this effect is not taken into account by a citizen who pressurizes the leader to
7The model could be easily generalized in many dimensions. Even if citizens are heterogeneous and some
debt is held domestically, the main insight remains the same as long as default makes the median voter
better off in sufficiently bad states (which is what creates time-inconsistency). Along the lines of Acharya
and Rajan (2013), we could have multiple periods, and when the state is bad and debt is low, the country
could roll over its debt and borrow more. However, unless the future cost of default is sufficiently high as to
eliminate any time-inconsistency problem, our qualitative the results would still hold. We could also allow,
following Broner, Martin and Ventura (2010), citizens to buy public debt on secondary markets. This would
not change the main insights, assuming in a bad state of the world the representative citizen (or median
voter) has little or no money with which to buy debt.
8If θ = R, then u(θ)−u(θ−R) > L as u(0) = −∞. By strict concavity of u, we have u′(θ−R) > u′(θ), so
when θ increases u(θ −R) increases faster than u(θ). If θ̄ is large enough, then diminishing marginal utility
of consumption will eventually cause the difference between u(θ) and u(θ − R) to become insignificant, so
u(θ)− u(θ −R) < L. Continuity the assures the existence of θ̂ such that u(θ̂)− u(θ̂ −R) = L.
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default at stage 3, because at that stage R has already been determined. To improve ex ante
welfare, then, the country’s institutions should make it possible to resist political pressure
and repay even when θ < θ̂.
Reducing the short-term electoral pressure on the political leaders could be done, e.g.,
by giving independent institutions (such as the central bank) more influence over economic
policy. The political leaders will then be able to blame these other institutions for unpopular
decisions, and only if the voters’ loss of utility is quite large would the leader’s position be
at risk. We model such an institutional framework in the simplest possible way: there is
∆ ≥ 0 such that if the leader repays the loan then he will be replaced at stage 4 if this
decision caused the representative citizen a net loss of utility of at least ∆. We assume ∆ is
an exogenously fixed parameter determined by the institutional structure — the higher is ∆
the less electoral pressure there is on the leader. As a special case, ∆ = 0 means the leader
must maximize the representative citizen’s payoff at each point in time.
Consider now the leader’s decision at stage 3. His objective is to maximize his expected
‘ego rents’. If he is replaced, he gets no ego rents. If he stays in office, then the ego rents
equal E if there was a default, and E if there was no default. We assume E < E, so that,
conditional on staying in office, the future benefits will be higher after repayment than after
default. The most straightforward justification for this is his reputational concerns, and that
repayment will facilitate greater ongoing access to credit markets (McGillivray and Smith,
2003). Also E will be low if outside lenders impose a penalty for default, or due to external
sanctions or policy constraints from international organizations like the IMF.
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By definition of ∆, the leader can repay without losing office when
u(θ −R) ≥ u(θ)− L−∆.
This implies that, for a given R, he will repay the loan if and only if θ ≥ θ(R,∆), where
θ(R,∆) satisfies
u(θ(R,∆)−R) = u(θ(R,∆))− L−∆. (2)
Note that θ(1,∆) > 1 because u(0) = −∞. When r = 0 the probability of default is
F (θ(1,∆)) > 0, so banks cannot break even at zero interest rate; a positive interest rate is
necessary to make up for the risk of default.
If ∆ = 0 then the cut-off point is θ(R, 0) = θ̂ which satisfies (1). This corresponds
to the case where intense political pressure forces the leader to always take the decision the
representative citizen prefers at stage 3. When∆ increases, the effect of political competition
becomes less intense, and the leader will be less constrained in his repayment decision.
A loan with interest rate r will be repaid when θ ≥ θ(R,∆), where R = 1+ r. Thus, the
loan is repaid with probability 1− F (θ(R,∆)). The expected profit for the bank that lends
$1 to the country will be
π(R,∆) ≡ (1− F (θ(R,∆)))R− 1.
Competition among banks implies that they make zero expected profit when the default
risk has been accounted for. Thus, the equilibrium interest rate must be such thatR = R∗(∆)
where R∗(∆) satisfies π(R∗(∆),∆) = 0. Any lower interest rate would yield a negative profit,
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i.e., if R < R∗(∆) then π(R,∆) < 0. As discussed above, a reduction in ∆ is interpreted as
a weaker institutional structure which allows greater short-term political pressure to be put
on the leader. We now show that a reduction in ∆ raises the risk premium.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium interest rate is decreasing in ∆. That is,
dR∗(∆)
d∆
< 0.
Proof. We know that
π(R∗(∆),∆) = 0. (3)
By definition of equilibrium, π(R,∆) < 0 for all R < R∗(∆). Therefore, we must have
π1(R
∗(∆),∆) > 0,
where the subscript denotes partial derivative. We obtain the partial derivative θ2(R,∆) by
differentiating (2):
θ2(R,∆) =
−1
u′(θ(R,∆)−R)− u′(θ(R,∆))
< 0
where the denominator is positive due to the strict concavity of u. We then have
π2(R,∆) = −θ2(R,∆)F
′(θ(R,∆))R > 0
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Totally differentiating (3) then gives
dR∗(∆)
d∆
= −
π2(R
∗(∆),∆)
π1(R∗(∆),∆)
< 0.
We now establish what was claimed above, namely, that ∆ = 0 leads to an inefficiently
high risk of default. To see this, let x denote a cut-off point such that the loan is repaid if
θ ≥ x and there is default if θ < x. The bank’s zero profit condition is (1−F (x))R− 1 = 0,
so that R = R̂(x), where
R̂(x) ≡
1
1− F (x)
.
The higher the cut-off point, the higher the default risk, hence the higher the interest rate:
R̂′(x) > 0. The representative citizen’s ex ante expected payoff, before the state is realized,
is:
EU =
∫ x
0
(u(θ)− L) dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
x
u(θ − R̂(x))dF (θ). (4)
If ∆ = 0 then the equilibrium cut-off point is x = θ̂ which satisfies (1). The required
repayment is
R̂(θ̂) =
1
1− F (θ̂)
.
The derivative of EU with respect to x, evaluated at the cut-off point θ̂, is strictly negative:
dEU
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=θ̂
= u(θ̂)− u
(
x0 − R̂(θ̂)
)
− L− R̂′(θ̂)
∫ ∞
θ̂
u′
(
θ − R̂(θ̂)
)
dF (θ) (5)
= −R̂′(θ̂)
∫ ∞
θ̂
u′
(
θ −R(θ̂)
)
dF (θ) < 0
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If the leader always gives in to public opinion, and therefore always maximizes the repre-
sentative citizen’s utility at stage 3, then the equilibrium cut-off point will be θ̂. If at stage
1 the country could commit to a stricter repayment policy, with a cut-off point x < θ̂, then
risk-premia would be lower (as R̂′(x) > 0). The inequality in (5) implies that the representa-
tive citizen would then be strictly better off, from the ex-ante perspective. This commitment
would require the leader not to give in to political political pressure to default at stage 3 even
though u(θ − R) < u(θ)− L. If the institutional framework does not mitigate this pressure
— if the country’s institutions are ‘myopic’ — then the risk-premium will be high and ex ante
welfare low. With a more ‘farsighted’ institutional framework, corresponding to ∆ > 0, the
risk premium is lower and ex ante welfare is higher. In short, the democratic disadvantage
is conditional:
Hypothesis 1: In democratic countries with ‘myopic’ institutions, political pressure (elec-
tion concerns) will make it difficult to repay in bad states of the world, so the risk premia
in international borrowing will be high.
Hypothesis 2: The democratic disadvantage (the high risk premium) is mitigated by
farsighted institutions.
4 Empirical Evidence
The empirical analysis builds directly on Beaulieu, Cox and Saiegh (2012) (BCS). As dis-
cussed above this work represents the current state of the art, with an inclusive dataset
covering 118 countries between 1961 and 2008.9 Notably this benchmark represents a par-
9Data availability reduces the sample size in the estimation.
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ticularly demanding test for the hypotheses of the present paper as BCS find in favour of
the democratic advantage.
4.1 Credit Ratings and Democracy
The dependent variables are credit ratings data from Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), in
particular Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, used to proxy for risk premia. These data are
qualitative and are converted to a numerical score, CR′, lying on a 16-point scale (with higher
ratings corresponding to lower risk premia and hence lower borrowing costs). Following
BCS and before them Archer, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007), the dependent variable in the
empirical work is CR = ln
(
1
16
+ 255
256
CR′
)
.10
The key explanatory variable is DEMOCRACY , a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
country-year is considered democratic according to the criteria in Przeworski et al (2000).
These data are updated by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). In order to quantify the
relationship between credit rating and democracy we follow a standard approach taken in
the literature and specify a basic pooled regression, where DEMOCRACY enters linearly.
The benchmark regression is:
CRit = XB+ γDEMOCRACYit + εit
10The use of credit ratings as the dependent variable requires the assumption that rating standards are
consistent across time and countries. The inherent unobservability of the underlying variable makes it dif-
ficult to rule out inconsistency although a partial defence of the ratings data is possible. Firstly, and not
surprisingly, the agencies claim reliability and comparability, and undoubtedly the agencies face important
forces compelling objective measurement. Secondly, Cantor and Packer (1996) document a strong correlation
between interest rate spreads (i.e. market-based measures of risk) and CRA ratings. Finally, any inconsis-
tencies such that do exist arguably are (or perhaps at least should be) represented by random measurement
error hence should not bias the estimation results.
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where CRit is the credit rating (separately from Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s) of
country i at time t. The control variables (in X) firstly follow Model 1 in BCS (in their
Table 2). Specifically these are lagged values of the current account balance, growth in GDP
per capita, the level of GDP, inflation, trade openness, a measure of resource endowment, a
default indicator set equal to 1 if default occurred in the previous 5 years and fixed decadal
effects.11 In addition to these controls we also include the current level of gross central
government debt measured as a percentage of GDP, from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).12
The estimation results below cluster standard errors by country as standard.
The specification follows BCS and therefore estimates γ using within-decade (but not
within country) cross-country comparisons, conditional on the lagged observables. Despite
the inclusion of an extensive set of control variables this identification is potentially biased, as
the possibility that DEMOCRACY is correlated with other unobservable drivers cannot be
ruled out. Below we therefore also make use of an instrumental variable approach following
Persson and Tabellini (2009) where DEMOCRACY is instrumented depending on foreign
democratic capital.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 1 contains estimation results, respectively using the Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s ratings, for the full data set.13 When using the full sample, consis-
11Debt as a percentage of GDP (as well as other control variables) could potentially be endogenous to
democratic status. However the mean (and standard deviation) of the debt ratio in democracies is 50.9
(62.8) and in non-democracies is 52.7 (47.1) hence the distributions are similar across the two groups.
12The debt stock is also endogenously related to the credit rating and so the estimated coefficient for
this variable should not be interpreted as reflecting a causal relationship. In principle it is possible that
any bias relating to this particular coefficient estimate could bias the parameter estimates of interest - in
particular relating to democracy and institutional quality. An earlier version of this paper (Dhillon et al,
2016) presented results excluding the debt stock and the results are very similar to those described here.
13Note that the reported sample sizes in table 1 are lower than those reported in BCS. The reason for this
is that the sample size they report applies to their first-stage regression — which examines whether or not a
country has a credit-rating at all. Table 1 in this paper corresponds to their second-stage regression — the
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tent with BCS we find evidence of a democratic advantage: in both columns the estimated
coefficient for democracy is positive, and statistically significant at the 10% level in the case
of the S&P credit rating. These results reflect the conventional wisdom that financial mar-
kets prefer democracy. However, inference from the full sample requires parameter stability
over the sample. The theory developed above suggests that the effect of democracy on credit
ratings may be conditional: the presence of good institutions neutralizes inefficiencies caused
by myopic election concerns. A first pass at this simply divides the sample depending on
OECD membership. The OECD Framework for the Consideration of Prospective Mem-
bers explicitly states requirements relating to institutions underpinning economic and public
governance.14 There is another reason for making this division. The theoretical model as-
sumes that the debt is held externally. As argued by Schultz and Weingast (2003), domestic
debt holders may exert pressure to repay, through the ballot or through some other internal
process. It is less clear how external lenders can hold elected leaders to account. For this
reason it also makes sense to distinguish between OECD members, with a greater capacity
to raise funds internally, and non-members, who are to a greater extent reliant on borrowing
externally.15 ,16 We hypothesize that there will be a democratic disadvantage for non-OECD
members who have not yet developed good institutions.
In columns 3 and 4 the sample is restricted to non-OECD countries, and the results
relating to democracy change meaningfully. In both columns the coefficient relating to
credit-rating itself — which inevitably is a smaller subset of the first-stage.
14See Annex 1 of http://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2017-13-EN.pdf
15Abbas et al (2014) document that non-resident held sovereign debt for 13 OECD members averaged
below 20% between 1961-2008. Conversely Panizza (2008) documents that developing countries’ sovereign
debt is typically held externally. For example in a sample of 97 countries in 1994, 70% of total public debt
was held externally.
16This split also has the advantage that the two subsamples are approximately equal.
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democracy is estimated to be negative and is statistically significant. Columns 5 and 6
conversely contain results for the OECD subsample. With the caveat that 95% of the
OECD sample is classified as democratic, it is still noteworthy that the estimated relationship
between credit ratings and democratic status is strongly positive. The coefficient estimates
are statistically different in the two subsamples (at p < 0.01) and without any ambiguity
the results show that the previously estimated democratic advantage is solely driven by the
OECD members. Democratization for a non-OECD member is instead (at least holding
other observables constant) statistically associated with a credit rating deterioration.
Our model assumes the electorate favours default in bad states of the world. In reality,
while foreign debt-holders cannot use the ballot to punish a defaulting democratic govern-
ment, domestic debt holders may use their ballots to this effect (Schulz and Weingast, 2003).
The key issue is therefore how much government debt is held by the (tax-paying) pivotal
voter. Columns 7 and 8 of table 1 contain results examining whether the effect of democracy
on a country’s credit rating changes depending on the extent to which public debt is held
internationally. Abbas et al (2010) provide data on outstanding public debt securities as a
percentage of GDP separately held by domestic and international lenders. We define DEBT
COMP as outstanding international public debt securities divided by outstanding domestic
public debt securities. Higher values of DEBT COMP thus indicate a greater reliance on in-
ternational lending. This variable is then multiplied by the democracy indicator variable
in order to generate an interaction term. The hypothesis here is that as the proportion of
debt held internationally increases, the democratic advantage deteriorates and hence that
the coefficient estimate on this interaction term is negative. For both credit ratings the co-
efficient estimate for this interaction term is negative as hypothesized, but is not significant.
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Whilst the smaller sample size here (necessitated because of limited coverage of the Abbas
et al (2010) data) is one possible explanation for this insignificance, the evidence suggests
that it is not the composition of debt that explains the difference between the OECD and
non-OECD members.
Table 2 reports results when the two-stage Heckman (1979) estimation methodology is
used, as in BCS. For convenience columns 1 and 2 duplicates their Model 2 where GDP per
capita replace GDP in levels as a control.17 These results point towards a strong democratic
advantage. Columns 3 and 4 restricts the sample to non-OECD countries and in this case
the statistical relationship is in both cases estimated to be negative, although is statistically
insignificant.
A significant concern with this empirical investigation is the non-random assignment of
the democracy ‘treatment’. Democracy is an outcome in itself and has its own drivers. In
particular correlation between these drivers and the error term in the regressions can mean
that the parameter estimates are biased. In order to address this concern we follow Persson
and Tabellini (2009) and use their measure of ‘foreign democratic capital’ (FDC) to instru-
ment democratic status in particular country-years. This measure is derived as a weighted
average of polity2 (democracy) scores in neighbouring countries with weights depending on
geographic distance. Persson and Tabellini (2009) use this measure to instrument for regime
in a growth regression and acknowledge the necessary exclusion restriction: that this vari-
able has no direct effect, in their case on domestic growth. Here the exclusion restriction
is that foreign democratic capital should have no direct effect on a country’s credit rating.
17The regression results here also control for sovereign debt (as a percentage of GDP) in addition to the
controls used in BCS.
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This seems reasonable — the effect of foreign democratic capital on domestic outcomes likely
manifests itself primarily through its effect on democracy itself.
Table 3 contains estimation results using FDC to instrument forDEMOCRACY . In the
full sample (columns 1 and 2) the coefficient estimates for (instrumented)DEMOCRACY in
the second-stage regression are positive, although are not statistically significant. When the
sample is restricted to the non-OECD countries (in columns 3 and 4) the coefficient estimates
are negative, and in the case of the Moody’s credit ratings this relationship is statistically
significant at the 10% level. The sample sizes are unfortunately here considerably reduced,
but the results are consistent with the inference arising from the OLS regressions.18 Moreover
the parameter estimates are reasonably stable in terms of magnitude, which suggests that
the OLS results are not systematically biased.
The IV regressions therefore provide some tentative evidence of a causal negative re-
lationship between credit ratings and DEMOCRACY outside of the OECD. This is con-
sistent with the mechanism developed in the formal model above, although it should be
acknowledged that this finding may potentially be explained through alternative mecha-
nisms. Nonetheless we maintain that the formal model captures at least an important part
of the tensions related to sovereign default risk. By definition democracy increases the po-
tency of the will of the citizenry. If the citizenry support default, then democracy can entail
increased default risk.
A further challenge with the empirical exercise is that both the credit ratings data and
the democracy indicator are highly persistent. In table 4 the analysis is extended to examine
the determinants of changes in credit ratings, and in particular whether credit-ratings are
18The Persson and Tabellini (2009) data end in 2000, which reduces the sample.
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differentially responsive to economic conditions. Our model emphasizes the role of economic
shocks as an impetus for default under democracy. An autocratic leader who is not account-
able to his citizens would be less responsive to their suffering (corresponding to a high ∆ in
our model) and hence more likely to repay in states of bad economic performance. Hence
we test a subsidiary hypothesis that changes to a country’s credit-rating are more sensitive
to economic performance measures under democracy than under autocracy.
Before interpreting the results in table 4 note that for both the Moody’s and Standard
and Poor’s ratings data, there is no annual change in a country’s credit rating in 84% of
the dataset. Identification in this table thus is obtained from the remaining 16% of obser-
vations. Positive realizations denote improvements in the credit score, hence the hypothesis
for example in the case of GDP per capita growth is that the coefficient estimate is positive
for both regime types, but larger in the case of democracies.
Columns 1 and 2 contain results for the full sample, columns 3 and 4 contain results
for the subset of democracies, and columns 5 and 6 contain results for the autocracies.
Whilst the sample size of autocracies is markedly smaller than that for the democracies
there are indications that credit ratings in democracies are somewhat more sensitive to
economic conditions than they are in autocracies. In the case of growth in GDP per capita
the coefficient estimates when using the democratic subsample (columns 3 and 4) are both
positive and significantly different from zero at the 5% level, whilst for autocracies (columns
5 and 6) they are statistically insignificant in both cases.
Similarly, differential responses to the current account can also be aligned with our the-
oretical model. Current account surpluses, and associated foreign exchange inflows, all else
equal imply a greater capacity to repay external debt. If the current account deteriorates
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then the utility loss to citizens from repaying debt is conceivably higher, and this utility loss
would matter more and hence increase default risk more in democratic countries than in
autocracies. The results are consistent with this. Credit ratings are positively and statisti-
cally significantly associated with improved current accounts in the case of the democracies.
Conversely the in the case of autocracies, there is no discernible relationship.19
4.2 Credit Ratings, Democracy and Institutions
Our hypothesis is that democratization causes a deterioration in credit ratings unless in-
stitutions can solve the time-inconsistency problem. In order to test whether the effect of
democracy on credit rating is conditional on the extent of myopia in policy-making, we make
use of data from the Global Insight Business Risk and Conditions database. In the words
of the data-provider their government effectiveness series (denoted GMO) captures “Policy
consistency and forward planning: How confident businesses can be of the continuity of eco-
nomic policy stance — whether a change of government will entail major policy disruption,
and whether the current government has pursued a coherent strategy. This factor also looks at
the extent to which policy-making is far-sighted, or conversely aimed at short-term economic
advantage.” (Our italics added.) Numerically they range from 0 (low government effec-
tiveness) to 1 (high government effectiveness). Not withstanding considerable measurement
issues these data arguably contain information regarding shortsightedness in policy-making.
The hypothesis that the effect of democracy on credit rating varies with farsightedness
in policy-making is investigated using an interaction of GMO with the democracy indicator.
19The results of table 4 are open to another interpretation - simply that the macrodata are to a greater ex-
tent mismeasured in the autocracies subsample. Given also that the subsample of autocracies is considerably
smaller the inference offered here is inevitably somewhat tentative.
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Following the theory the ‘unconditional’ response of credit rating to democracy is hypothe-
sized to be negative. When GMO is at its minimum, then democratization is hypothesized
to lead to a deterioration in the credit rating. However the interaction of DEMOCRACY
with GMO is hypothesized to be positive. The democratic disadvantage is ameliorated when
institutions are far-sighted.
Table 5 contains estimation results augmenting the benchmark specification to include
GMO and its interaction with DEMOCRACY .20 Columns 1 and 2 contain results for the
full sample and columns 3 and 4 for the non-OECD countries only. Notably, controlling for
GMO and its interaction with DEMOCRACY substantially aligns the results of the full
sample with those of the non-OECD subsample. This corroborates the argument that the
effect of Democracy is conditional on institutional quality. Moreover in all instances the esti-
mated coefficients are consistent with the theoretical hypotheses: when institutional quality
(GMO) is low, then democracy is associated with lower credit ratings. When institutional
quality is high, then democracy is associated with higher credit ratings. These results are
statistically significant in the full sample, though this is reduced in the smaller sample of
non-OECD countries.
Following previous literature, the dependent variable in this analysis is a non-linear func-
tion of the underlying credit rating, hence inference of the effect of a change toDEMOCRACY
on credit ratings depends both on the value of GMO and also the initial credit rating. In
order to get a simple quantification of the estimation results, in column 5 we re-estimate
column 2 (which has the more conservative estimates) replacing the dependent variable with
a linear credit rating score (CR′, described above). The estimation results confirm the find-
20The sample sizes are smaller when including GMO as these data only begin in 1996.
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ings: at low levels of GMO the estimated relationship between democracy and credit scores
is negative, whilst at high levels it is positive. The 25th percentile of the GMO institutional
quality measure is GMO = 0.38.21 At this value DEMOCRACY is associated with a re-
duction in the credit rating of about 3 investment grades on the 16-point scale. However
at the 75th percentile of institutional quality GMO = 0.69, DEMOCRACY is associated
with approximately a 1.5 investment grade improvement.22
Table 6 splits the sample by regime-type to focus on differential effects of institutional
quality. Our theory emphasizes that democracies face a time-inconsistency problem caused
by concerns for the welfare of the electorate, but this may be alleviated by farsighted in-
stitutions (approximated by GMO). There are of course other important channels through
which institutional quality can influence credit ratings under any regime-type. Nonetheless
the theory is suggestive that the premium to farsightedness should be higher under democ-
racy, since democracies face the problem of time-inconsistency. Columns 1 and 2 contain
results for democracies, and columns 3 and 4 contain results for autocracies. Consistent with
the theory the estimated sensitivity of the credit rating to institutional quality is quantita-
tively and statistically stronger under democratic regime types.
In table 7 the analysis extends to examining how citizens’ capacity to exert political
pressure on the leader affects the credit rating. Conceivably the DEMOCRACY indicator
variable by itself fails to capture all of the relevant information. Replacement of leaders may
21GMO = 0.28 undoubtedly indicates weak institutions. The minimum value taken in the OECD sub-
sample is GMO = 0.5.
22If Democracy ‘switches on’ (i.e. = 1 rather than 0) then the dependent variable (the credit rating) falls
by -8.859 (the first coefficient in the table), but there is an offsetting effect depending on the level of GMO.
If GMO = 0.25, then the offset is 0.25*1*15.094 = 3.774 (using the 2nd coefficient in the table), hence the
net effect is -8.859 + 3.774 = -5.085. If GMO = 0.75, then the offset is 0.75*1*15.094 = 11.321 and the net
effect is -8.859 + 11.321 = 2.462.
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occur in autocracies, and even if not, an autocratic leader may be constrained to take into
account the welfare of his citizens. Conversely, elected leaders with large majorities may be
well insulated from political pressure.
To investigate this empirically, table 7 includes two separate regressors, encapsulating
the extent to which the populace can exert political pressure on the leader, both taken from
the Database of Political Institutions. In particular we use the variables FRAC, measur-
ing the probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature will be from
different parties, and MAJ , measuring the margin of victory — the fraction of seats held
by the government. High values of FRAC and low values of MAJ denote greater political
competition, which we take to act as a proxy for the capacity of the populace (and the
representative voter) to exert political pressure on the leader. Ideally we would have direct
measures of the citizens’ political pressure to default specifically, although such measures
do not exist. Nonetheless, the main premise of the paper is that citizens’ political power in
general can lead to greater default risk. Given the stronger requirement to please the citi-
zenry, then the temptation for the government to default increases and a lower credit rating
ensues. The two measures are negatively correlated though not perfectly (the correlation
coefficient is ρ = −0.77). The means (and standard deviations) for FRAC and MAJ under
democracy are respectively 0.65 (0.14) and 0.56 (0.15). Under autocracy the correspond-
ing values are 0.32 (0.31) and 0.83 (0.19). Unsurprisingly FRAC (MAJ) is higher (lower)
under democracy, but the data display interesting variation — suggesting that autocrats are
in some instances politically constrained, and conversely that some elected governments are
relatively unconstrained.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 7 augments the regression model used in columns 1 and 2 of
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table 1 to include FRAC.23 Firstly note that the coefficient estimate for DEMOCRACY is
negative in all specifications in this table, and is significantly different from zero at the 10%
level in the case of column 1. In both columns 1 and 2 the estimated coefficient for FRAC
is negative, but statistically insignificant. An increase in the probability that two deputies
picked at random from the legislature are from different parties is weakly associated with a
worsened credit rating.
However when political pressure is instead proxied using MAJ (in columns 3 and 4 of
table 7) the relevant coefficient estimates are positive, as hypothesized, and are significantly
different from zero at the 5% level, in both cases. The larger the fraction of seats held by
the government, the better the credit rating. Arguably MAJ is a better measure of the
underlying political pressure mechanism. For example FRAC is prone to increase with the
number of opposition parties, which by itself would not clearly constrain a government that
say held a given 60% of the legislature. It is this latter number which better measures the
extent to which the government is insulated from political pressure.
A natural extension examines the interaction of DEMOCRACY with MAJ . In prin-
ciple one might expect that political pressure (measured, inversely, by MAJ) would have
a stronger effect under democracy. However, in unreported regressions this interaction was
found to be wholly insignificant in all cases. The conclusion we draw from these findings
is that political pressure exists, and operates to increase the inclination to default, under
both systems. Hence a reduction inMAJ (and concomitant increased political competition)
represents an increase in pressure from the citizens in autocracies as well as democracies.
Autocracies are rarely in practice isolated from the will of the people, and increases inMAJ
23The result in table 7 also control for OECD membership in order to proxy for institutional quality.
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under such circumstances imply greater default risk in the same way as under democracy.
In general a shift towards DEMOCRACY represents a substantial fall in MAJ , hence the
results are consistent with the main hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
There is no consensus in the literature on whether there is a democratic advantage in sov-
ereign debt repayment. While authors such as Schultz and Weingast (2003) have argued in
favour of a democratic advantage, Saeigh (2005) finds that this is not true when the sam-
ple includes developing countries. We have attempted to reconcile these views by arguing
that the relationship between democracy and default rates is conditional on the institutional
structure.
In our model, leader accountability to those ultimately liable to pay back the debt con-
fers an inherent democratic disadvantage, with higher default rates and concomitant higher
risk premia. Commitment to rational long term decision-making ameliorates the problem.
In effect, we reiterate the conclusions of Shultz and Weingast (2003): ultimately it is the
institutions of mature democracies that determine the democratic advantage. In our model,
good institutions imply the ability to override the citizens’ desire to default in bad states of
the world. If a country has not yet developed such institutions, then democratization will
lead to lower credit ratings, as political leaders try to maximize their constituents’ utility
at each point in time. Thus, even controlling for income levels, we expect a non-monotonic
relationship between democracy and credit ratings.
Empirically, we find that there is no democratic advantage outside the OECD. The
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estimated relationship between observed credit-ratings and democratic status is found to
be strongly conditional on institutional farsightedness. When government is measured to be
myopic there is evidence of a democratic disadvantage: democracy is associated with a cost of
about 3 investment grades on the standard 16-point grading structure employed by Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s. When government is measured to be farsighted, democracy is
associated with improved credit ratings by about 1.5 investment grades. Increased political
pressure as measured inversely by the fraction of seats held by the governing party is also
associated with worsening credit scores.
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Data Appendix
Series Description Source
Moody’s Country Credit Rating BCS
S&P Country Credit Rating BCS
DEMOCRACY Democracy Indicator BCS
CURRENT ACCOUNT Percentage GDP BCS
GDP.CAP Growth GDP per capita growth BCS
GDP GDP in US$ (100,000,000 units) BCS
INFLATION Annual percentage change in CPI BCS
TRADE Percentage GDP BCS
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT Constructed by adding annual ores, metals and fuel ex-
ports as a percentage of merchandise exports
BCS
DEFAULT Dummy variable indicating whether external default or
debt restructuring tooke place
BCS
GOV DEBT Gross central government debt, percentage of GDP. RR
DEBT COMP Ratio of outstanding international public debt securities
to outstanding domestic public debt securities
PDD
FDC Foreign Democratic Capital PT
GMO Government effectiveness GIBRCD
FRAC Probability that two deputies picked at random from the
legislature will be from different parties
DPI
MAJ Fraction of seats held by the government DPI
Notes: BCS denotes Beaulieu, Cox and Saiegh (2012). RR is Reinhart and Kenneth S.
Rogoff (2011). PDD is the historical debt database constructed by Abbas et al (2010). PT is
Persson and Tabellinii (2009). GIBRCD is the Global Insight Business Risk and Conditions
Database. DPI is the Database of Political Institutions
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Credit Rating Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DEMOCRACY 0.161
(1.41)
0.227
(1.84)∗
−0.303
(1.77)∗
−0.403
(2.70)∗∗
0.277
(8.85)∗∗∗
0.610
(28.4)∗∗∗
0.378
(2.52)∗∗
0.545
(1.65)∗∗∗
GOV DEBT −0.002
(1.09)
−0.002
(0.92)
−0.005
(1.42)
−0.007
(1.77)∗
−0.001
(1.49)
−0.001
(1.27)
−0.004
(1.36)
−0.004
(1.35)
DEBT COMP −0.016
(0.26)
0.059
(0.63)
DEBT COMP∗DEMOCRACY −0.095
(0.73)
−0.141
(1.19)
CURRENT ACCOUNT (lag ) 0.016
(1.27)
0.004
(0.34)
0.005
(0.36)
−0.019
(1.31)
0.004
(0.85)
0.004
(0.86)
−0.006
(0.54)
−0.008
(0.63)
GDP.CAP Growth (lag ) 0.013
(1.11)
0.015
(1.24)
0.021
(1.55)
0.027
(1.89)∗∗
−0.020
(3.34)∗∗∗
−0.023
(4.01)∗∗∗
−0.002
(0.22)
0.001
(0.06)
GDP (lag ) 0.0001
(3.13)∗∗∗
0.0001
(3.08)∗∗∗
0.0005
(1.79)∗
0.0002
(0.86)
0.000
(3.09)∗∗∗
0.000
(2.72)∗∗
0.0001
(2.38)∗∗
0.0001
(2.43)∗∗∗
INFLATION (lag ) −0.0005
(1.42)
−0.0004
(0.85)
−0.0004
(1.34)
−0.000
(0.06)
−0.019
(22.9)∗∗∗
−0.025
(39.0)∗∗∗
−0.0002
(1.09)
−0.0001
(0.20)
TRADE (lag ) 0.005
(3.10)∗∗∗
0.004
(2.63)∗∗
0.006
(3.53)∗∗∗
0.005
(3.54)∗∗∗
0.002
(2.07)∗∗
0.001
(1.48)
0.005
(2.28)∗∗
0.005
(2.67)∗∗
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT (lag ) −0.005
(1.15)
−0.005
(1.45)
−0.003
(0.55)
−0.002
(0.51)
0.001
(0.98)
0.002
(1.84)∗
−0.003
(0.58)
−0.003
(0.52)
DEFAULT −1.263
(4.24)∗∗∗
−1.266
(4.10)∗∗∗
−0.743
(2.92)∗∗∗
−0.772
(3.21)∗∗∗
(OMITTED) (OMITTED) −1.339
(4.12)∗∗∗
−1.668
(3.76)∗∗∗
INTERCEPT 1.641
(6.33)∗∗∗
1.775
(8.73)∗∗∗
1.224
(2.80)∗∗∗
1.872
(6.31)∗∗∗
2.404
(19.02)∗∗∗
2.091
(17.47)∗∗∗
1.928
(7.14)∗∗∗
1.749
(5.75)∗∗∗
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full non-OECD non-OECD OECD OECD Full Full
Observations 1012 929 441 377 571 552 551 544
R2 0.395 0.350 0.403 0.342 0.64 0.74 0.418 0.662
Table 1: Estimation Results - the effect of democracy on credit ratings
Notes: The decade fixed effects are not shown. t-statistics in parentheses (with standard errors clustered by country).
Statistical Significance at *90% confidence level; **95% confidence level; ***99% confidence level.
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Credit Rating Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEMOCRACY 0.408
(3.27)∗∗∗
0.472
(3.56)∗∗∗
−0.171
(0.82)
−0.237
(1.35)
GOV DEBT −0.005
(2.12)∗∗
−0.005
(1.89)∗
−0.008
(2.28)∗∗
−0.009
(2.51)∗∗
CURRENT ACCOUNT (lag ) 0.010
(0.79)
−0.004
(0.35)
0.000
(0.03)
−0.025
(2.50)∗∗
GDP.CAP Growth (lag ) 0.012
(0.92)
0.014
(1.10)
0.021
(1.37)
0.026
(1.76)∗
GDP (lag ) 0.000
(2.88)∗∗∗
0.000
(2.97)∗∗∗
0.001
(1.58)
0.000
(1.38)
INFLATION (lag ) −0.004
(1..21)
−0.000
(0.64)
−0.000
(0.89)
0.000
(0.14)
TRADE (lag ) 0.006
(3.25)∗∗∗
0.005
(2.71)∗∗∗
0.007
(2.70)∗∗∗
0.006
(3.77)∗∗∗
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT (lag ) −0.004
(0.78)
−0.003
(0.79)
−0.001
(0.18)
0.001
(0.31)
DEFAULT −1.337
(3.76)∗∗∗
−1.439
(4.19)∗∗∗
−0.618
(1.92)∗
−0.783
(2.97)∗∗∗
INTERCEPT 1.483
(5.72)∗∗∗
1.452
(5.71)∗∗∗
1.280
(2.75)∗∗∗
1.460
(4.51)∗∗∗
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ (rho) 0.576
(5.13)∗∗∗
0.546
(5.70)∗∗∗
0.440
(4.08)∗∗∗
0.406
(4.04)∗∗∗
Wald test (ρ = 0) χ2 26.27∗∗∗ 32.49∗∗∗ 16.68∗∗∗ 16.34∗∗∗
Sample Full Full non-OECD non-OECD
Observations 1954 1871 1300 1236
Table 2: Heckman (Selection) Estimation Results - the effect of democracy on
credit ratings
Notes: Heckman (1979) estimation following Beaulieu, Cox and Saiegh (2012). The decade fixed
effects are not shown. Z-statistics in parentheses. Statistical Significance at *90% confidence level;
**95% confidence level; ***99% confidence level.
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Credit Rating Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEMOCRACY 0.150
(0.50)
0.423
(1.11)
−0.570
(1.76)∗
−0.283
(0.54)
GOV DEBT −0.001
(0.71)
0.001
(0.41)
−0.006
(2.16)∗∗
−0.006
(1.91)∗
CURRENT ACCOUNT (lag ) 0.021
(2.44)∗∗
0.011
(1.07)
0.005
(0.33)
−0.011
(0.50)
GDP.CAP Growth (lag ) 0.016
(1.47)
0.024
(1.45)
0.021
(1.30)
0.039
(1.31)
GDP (lag ) 0.0001
(3.86)∗∗∗
0.0001
(3.21)∗∗∗
0.000
(0.99)
0.0004
(1.33)
INFLATION (lag ) −0.0006
(2.11)∗∗
−0.0004
(1.38)
−0.0005
(1.66)∗
−0.000
(0.33)
TRADE (lag ) 0.005
(3.25)∗∗∗
0.002
(1.48)
0.005
(2.36)∗∗
0.001
(0.89)
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT (lag ) −0.001
(0.54)
−0.002
(0.85)
−0.000
(0.05)
−0.001
(0.34)
DEFAULT −0.800
(4.22)∗∗∗
−1.045
(5.33)∗∗∗
−0.211
(1.00)
−0.620
(3.07)∗∗∗
INTERCEPT 1.701
(5.45)∗∗∗
1.713
(4.27)∗∗∗
1.850
(3.84)∗∗∗
2.319
(3.43)∗∗∗
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full non-OECD non-OECD
Observations 668 588 255 194
F-test 17.12 28.74 37.69 37.12
Table 3: Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
Notes: Regressions estimated by Two-Stage-Least-Squares whereDEMOCRACY is instrumented
using Persson and Tabellini’s (2009) measure of foreign democratic capital. F-test denotes the F
statistic of the significance of the instrument in the first stage regression. Other notes as for table
1.
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Credit Rating Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GOV DEBT −0.0008
(1.77)∗
−0.0009
(0.97)∗
−0.0008
(1.82)∗
−0.0009
(1.76)∗
−0.0018
(1.35)
−0.0040
(1.79)∗
CURRENT ACCOUNT (lag ) 0.0067
(2.21)∗∗
0.0040
(1.62)
0.0092
(2.51)∗∗
0.0051
(1.86)∗
−0.0052
(1.18)
−0.0100
(0.50)
GDP.CAP Growth (lag ) 0.0113
(1.91)∗
0.0117
(1.96)∗
0.0148
(2.02)∗∗
0.0156
(2.19)∗∗
−0.0038
(0.44)
0.0036
(0.61)
GDP (lag ) 0.0000
(1.44)
0.0000
(0.17)
0.0000
(1.65)
−0.0000
(0.00)
−0.0000
(0.37)
0.0000
(0.03)
INFLATION (lag ) 0.0000
(0.13)
0.0001
(1.02)
0.0000
(0.24)
0.0000
(0.38)
0.0004
(0.31)
0.0043
(0.19)
TRADE (lag ) 0.0001
(0.42)
−0.0001
(0.51)
0.0002
(0.80)
−0.0001
(0.32)
0.0004
(1.22)
0.0012
(0.78)
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT (lag ) −0.0001
(0.12)
−0.0013
(2.01)∗∗
−0.0002
(0.48)
−0.0013
(1.98)∗
0.0018
(1.18)
0.0039
(1.22)
DEFAULT −0.043
(1.09)
0.150
(0.77)
−0.378
(0.85)
−0.290
(1.32)
−0.080
(0.85)
−0.622
(2.54)∗∗
INTERCEPT −0.081
(0.62)
0.101
(1.37)
−0.110
(0.85)
0.568
(0.85)
0.219
(1.37)
0.073
(0.43)
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Democracies Democracies Autocracies Autocracies
Observations 964 883 842 779 122 104
R2 0.033 0.027 0.041 0.053 0.093 0.079
Table 4: Estimation Results - the determinants of changes to credit ratings
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual difference in the credit rating. The decade fixed effects are not shown.
t-statistics in parentheses (with standard errors clustered by country). Statistical Significance at *90% confidence
level; **95% confidence level; ***99% confidence level.
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Credit Rating Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P Linear(S&P)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEMOCRACY −1.831
(3.51)∗∗∗
−1.287
(2.52)∗∗
−1.660
(2.19)∗∗
−1.128
(1.59)
−8.859
(5.73)∗∗∗
DEMOCRACY*GMO 2.504
(3.41)∗∗∗
1.768
(2.41)∗∗
2.203
(1.91)∗
1.332
(1.19)
15.094
(6.23)∗∗∗
GMO 0.607
(0.84)
1.136
(1.49)
0.682
(0.69)
1.118
(1.16)
4.787
(2.04)∗∗
GOV DEBT −0.004
(1.47)
−0.003
(1.39)
−0.006
(1.23)
−0.008
(1.82)∗
−0.008
(1.06)
CURRENT ACCOUNT (lag ) 0.006
(0.46)
−0.007
(0.81)
0.003
(0.16)
−0.021
(1.23)
0.061
(1.61)
GDP.CAP Growth (lag ) 0.017
(1.32)
0.014
(1.26)
0.019
(1.04)
0.012
(0.79)
−0.030
(0.90)
GDP (lag ) 0.0001
(1.87)∗
0.0001
(1.90)∗
0.000
(1.06)
0.0003
(1.22)
0.0001
(1.90)∗
INFLATION (lag ) −0.009
(1.95)∗
−0.013
(3.89)∗∗∗
−0.013
(1.81)∗
−0.012
(2.52)∗∗
−0.060
(6.20)∗∗∗
TRADE (lag ) 0.002
(1.18)
0.002
(1.36)
0.004
(1.48)
0.004
(2.13)∗∗
0.011
(1.49)
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT (lag ) −0.006
(1.28)
−0.002
(0.51)
−0.004
(0.61)
0.001
(0.26)
−0.003
(0.32)
DEFAULT −0.793
(2.30)∗∗
−0.633
(1.76)∗
−0.625
(1.66)
−0.522
(1.55)
−0.620
(0.90)
INTERCEPT 1.580
(3.19)∗∗∗
1.179
(2.37)∗∗
1.311
(1.57)
1.134
(1.62)
3.807
(2.42)∗∗
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full non-OECD non-OECD Full
Observations 584 572 312 300 572
R2 0.600 0.596 0.436 0.400 0.846
Table 5: Estimation Results - conditional effects of democratization
Notes: GMO is the government effectiveness measure from the Global Insight Business Risk and
Conditions database described in the text. Columns 1-4 use CR as the dependent variable, column
5 uses CR′ (both variables are defined at the beginning of section 3). The decade fixed effects
are not shown. t-statistics in parentheses (with standard errors clustered by country). Statistical
Significance at *90% confidence level; **95% confidence level; ***99% confidence level.
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Credit Rating Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GMO 3.202
(6.37)∗∗∗
2.965
(7.25)∗∗∗
1.144
(1.81)∗
0.962
(1.04)
GOV DEBT −0.004
(1.31)
−0.003
(1.23)
−0.003
(1.29)
−0.005
(1.39)
CURRENT ACCOUNT (lag ) 0.009
(0.58)
−0.006
(0.61)
−0.010
(0.89)
−0.033
(1.28)
GDP.CAP Growth (lag ) 0.013
(0.79)
0.014
(1.19)
0.019
(0.76)
−0.017
(0.60)
GDP (lag ) 0.000
(1.80)∗
0.000
(1.75)∗
0.0005
(2.29)∗∗
0.0005
(2.76)∗∗
INFLATION (lag ) −0.007
(1.46)
−0.011
(3.25)∗∗∗
−0.020
(1.89)∗
−0.022
(1.72)
TRADE (lag ) 0.003
(1.08)
0.002
(0.95)
0.003
(2.00)∗
0.004
(1.74)
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT (lag ) −0.007
(1.23)
−0.003
(0.61)
0.008
(1.47)
0.010
(2.27)∗∗
DEFAULT −0.686
(1.49)
−0.507
(1.05)
−1.19
(3.27)∗∗∗
−0.779
(2.06)∗
INTERCEPT −0.357
(0.69)
−0.167
(0.45)
0.887
(1.61)
1.165
(1.93)∗
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Democracies Democracies Autocracies Autocracies
Observations 489 478 95 94
R2 0.600 0.619 0.729 0.675
Table 6: Estimation Results - benefits of far-sighted institutions, democracies
and autocracies
Notes: GMO is the government effectiveness measure from the Global Insight Business Risk and
Conditions database described in the text. The decade fixed effects are not shown. t-statistics in
parentheses (with standard errors clustered by country). Statistical Significance at *90% confidence
level; **95% confidence level; ***99% confidence level.
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Credit Rating Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC −0.395
(1.04)
−0.285
(0.83)
MAJ 1.122
(2.11)∗∗
1.038
(2.08)∗∗
DEMOCRACY −0.255
(1.74)∗
−0.162
(0.98)
−0.145
(1.07)
−0.056
(0.38)
GOV DEBT −0.004
(1.98)∗
−0.003
(1.88)∗
−0.004
(2.22)∗∗
−0.004
(2.19)∗∗
CURRENT ACCOUNT (lag ) 0.009
(0.85)
−0.004
(0.58)
0.003
(0.38)
−0.010
(1.30)
GDP.CAP Growth (lag ) 0.016
(1.66)
0.020
(1.80)∗
0.013
(1.32)
0.016
(1.50)
GDP (lag ) 0.0001
(2.53)∗∗
0.0001
(2.40)∗∗
0.0001
(3.16)∗∗∗
0.0001
(2.96)∗∗∗
INFLATION (lag ) −0.0003
(1.05)
−0.0002
(0.55)
−0.0003
(1.20)
−0.0002
(0.44)
TRADE (lag ) 0.005
(3.22)∗∗∗
0.004
(3.60)∗∗∗
0.005
(3.03)∗∗∗
0.004
(3.58)∗∗∗
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT (lag ) −0.001
(0.18)
−0.001
(0.01)
0.001
(0.37)
0.001
(0.57)
DEFAULT −0.707
(2.63)∗∗
−0.737
(2.84)∗∗∗
−0.663
(2.69)∗∗∗
−0.750
(2.93)∗∗∗
OECD 1.008
(6.85)∗∗∗
0.986
(6.70)∗∗∗
1.058
(6.83)∗∗∗
1.035
(6.94)∗∗∗
INTERCEPT 1.617
(5.91)∗∗∗
1.631
(6.99)∗∗∗
0.603
(1.19)
0.742
(1.72)∗
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full
Observations 963 898 977 912
R2 0.529 0.521 0.555 0.545
Table 7: Estimation Results - political pressure and credit ratings
Notes: FRAC is the probability that two deputies in the lower house picked at random will be from
different parties. MAJ is the fraction of seats held by the government. The decade fixed effects
are not shown. t-statistics in parentheses (with standard errors clustered by country). Statistical
Significance at *90% confidence level; **95% confidence level; ***99% confidence level.
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